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WHAT IS POWER SHARING? CONSOCIATIONALISM, CENTRIPETALISM, AND HYBRID POWER SHARING

Abstract

In this article the author analyzes the term “power sharing” (PS) in the context of power exercised within a state. He first examines the term in the very general sense, in which it can be applied to all types and dimensions of power sharing between various groups and institutional entities. Second, the author examines the meaning of the term in the narrow sense, that is, the phenomenon of systemic power sharing by groups (segments) whose membership is based on ascribed criteria such as common ancestors, relatives, or racial background, and/or cultural ones such as a common language, religion, or celebrations. The basic segmental units in this sense are nations (understood in the sociological sense), ethnic groups, or religious and denominational communities that form part of divided societies. Third, the article shows the differences between the principal models (types) of PS in the narrow sense: consociationalism, centripetalism, and hybrid power sharing.

Keywords: power sharing, consociationalism, centripetalism, hybrid power sharing.

INTRODUCTION

Although the term “power sharing” (PS) is very often encountered in the political sciences, it has not been precisely defined and there is no consensus among political scientists as to its exact meaning. In other words, the term has not yet been fully conceptualized; it has not completed its passage from a notion—the stage at which

potential meanings are imagined and assigned—to the stage at which the term becomes a bona-fide theoretical concept, defined on the basis of in-depth and usually empirically based theoretical reflection.

In this article I analyze the term “PS” in the context of power exercised within a state. I first examine the term in the broad sense, in which it can be applied to all types and dimensions of power sharing between various groups and institutional entities.

Second, I examine the meaning of the term in the narrow sense, that is, the phenomenon of systemic power sharing in a state by groups (segments) whose membership is based on ascribed criteria (for example, common ancestors, living relatives, or racial background) and/or cultural ones (for example, a common language, religion, or celebrations).¹ Members of such segments are conscious of belonging to them and of possessing traits that form the ascriptive or cultural bases of their identity, setting them apart from members of other segments. The basic segmental units in this sense are nations (understood in the sociological, not political, sense), ethnic groups, and religious and denominational communities that form a part of so-called divided (multi-segmental) societies, including deeply divided ones.²

Third, I show the differences between the principal models (types) of PS in the narrow sense: consociationalism, centripetalism (also called integrative PS), and hybrid power sharing.³ The first two models are comprised of a number of characteristic institutions

¹ B. Krauz-Mozer, “Tożsamość – czy to tylko suma spotkań i opowieści?” [“Identity – Is It Just the Sum of Meetings and Stories?”], *Studia Środkowoeuropejskie i Bałkanistyczne*, 2017, Vol. 26, p. 14.

² B. O’Leary, “Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places: An Advocate’s Introduction,” in: *Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places*, J. McEvoy, B. O’Leary (eds.), University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2013, pp. 5–6.

³ Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry also single out *multiculturalism* and *territorial pluralism*. See B. O’Leary, “Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places...,” pp. 19–21. The mainly theoretical PS models are, especially, the Lewis Model, (W. Arthur Lewis, *Politics in West Africa*, Oxford University Press, New York 1965; W. Arthur Lewis, “Beyond African Dictatorship: The Crisis of the One-Party State,” *Encounter*, August 1965, pp. 3–18; Y. Mine, “The Political Element in the Works of W. Arthur Lewis: The 1954 Lewis Model and African Development,” *The Developing Economies*, 2006, Vol. 44, Issue 3, pp. 329–355) and Complex Power Sharing (S. Wolff, Conflict Resolution between Power Sharing and Power Dividing, or Beyond?” *Political Studies Review*, 2007, Vol. 5, pp. 363–379; S. Wolff, “Complex Power Sharing,” in: *Elgar Handbook of Civil War and Fragile States*, G.K. Brown, A. Langer (eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2012, pp. 457–477; S. Wolff, *Situating Complex Power Sharing in the Conflict Settlement Literature*, 2010, pp. 1–24, <http://stefanwolff.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/CPSbgrd.pdf> [access: March 21, 2018].

(understood as a set of principles), corresponding to the conceptual bases of these models. In addition to full models, in multi-segmental states it is possible to distinguish certain consociational or centripetal institutions that are not, in those states, part of a larger set of PS institutions typical of a given model.

The third model I propose to call “hybrid power sharing” (HPS), because it combines elements that are typical of either the consociational or the centripetal PS models. In the HPS model, elements of one of the PS models in the narrow sense are dominant but are enhanced by certain institutions typical of the other model. The functioning of the HPS model has yet to be fully described in the literature.⁴

My analysis concentrates above all on the narrow sense of PS, which is easier to conceptualize than the broad sense as it is more specific. Mine is one voice in a wider discussion as I attempt to establish the meaning of the term “PS.” Making a clear differentiation between the two principal meanings of the term is intended to help researchers make more precise and conscious use of the terms. I believe such a distinction is needed to achieve a clearer scholarly discourse.

PS IN THE BROAD SENSE

The term “PS” in the broad sense refers to different dimensions, means, and entities of power sharing in a state. PS can be associated above all with the notion of separation of powers, a key concept in the political sciences. It is akin to the “tripartite system” of legislative, executive, and judiciary branches laid out by Montesquieu in his *De l'esprit des lois* and originating in John Locke's ideas in *Two Treatises on Government*. In this sense, power is shared in the same horizontal dimension between different branches of government, which exercise different powers.

⁴ See articles on the topic by K. Trzciński, “Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia,” *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, 2017, Vol. 46, Issue 1, pp. 168–185; K. Trzciński, “The Consociational Addition to Indonesia's Centripetalism as a Tactic of the Central Authorities: The Case of Papua,” *Hemispheres: Studies on Cultures and Societies*, 2016, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 5–20; K. Trzciński, “How Theoretically Opposite Models of Interethnic Power-Sharing Can Complement Each Other and Contribute to Political Stabilization: The Case of Nigeria,” *Politeja*, 2016, No. 42, Issue 3, pp. 53–73.

In the horizontal dimension, PS can arise between various political parties (as part of coalition governments formed after the elections), but also between political parties and other entities (such as trade unions and various social organizations and movements), as well as between men and women.

Certain scholars understand the term “PS” to mean power shared between the parties of a conflict, which has been settled by a peace accord.⁵ Such a situation most often entails the de facto adoption of the term “PS” as a means to describe power sharing within the framework of something that has long been known in the literature as a “government of national unity.” Thus in the context of peace-building, “power sharing is used as a tool for the resolution of conflict or its prevention in the future” and is defined as an “elite pact between representatives of political or military parties on the division of responsibility in different fields of political and economic life.”⁶ Such a definition of PS has been used to analyze the ending of armed conflicts in the early 21st century, especially in various states of Sub-Saharan Africa. In such cases, PS agreements are called “a specific instrument of conflict mediation” and “include the negotiating of a peace settlement between incumbents and rebels that provides for the partition of power within a government of national unity.”⁷

Another type of PS in the broad sense is also the political elites’ sharing of power with citizens. Such a phenomenon can be observed especially in the case of participatory or deliberative democracy. Both types of democracy allow non-politicians to participate—albeit in a somewhat different manner—in the political decision-making process. The first functions at the level of local self-government; the participatory budget is its most commonly used institution. The second, by promoting debate (including at the expert level) as a path to better quality political decisions with a higher degree of social legitimacy, can exist at various levels of power but continues to be mostly a theoretical concept.

⁵ F. Zanker, C. Simons, A. Mehler, “Power, Peace, and Space in Africa: Revisiting Territorial Power Sharing,” *African Affairs*, 2014, Vol. 114, Issue 454, pp. 72–91; A. Mehler, “Power Sharing,” in: *Routledge Handbook of African Politics*, N. Cheeseman, D. Anderson, A. Scheibler (eds.), Routledge, Oxford 2013, pp. 189–201; A. Mehler, “Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship,” *African Affairs*, 2009, Vol. 108, Issue 432, pp. 453–473; D.M. Tull, A. Mehler, “The Hidden Costs of PS: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa,” *African Affairs*, 2005, Vol. 104, No. 416, pp. 375–398.

⁶ F. Zanker, C. Simons, A. Mehler, *Power, Peace, and Space in Africa...*, p. 72.

⁷ D.M. Tull, A. Mehler, *The Hidden Costs of PS...*, p. 386.

Various solutions in a state's territorial organization, including decentralization and federalization, can be seen as a type of vertical PS. In such situations power is shared between different levels of government: local, state (provincial), and central/federal.

As can be seen in the examples cited, in the broad sense, the term "PS" can be very capacious. In this case, PS concerns the participation of more than one group or institutional entity in some form of state power and at some of its levels. PS in the broad sense seems to be accurately defined by B. O'Leary as "any set of arrangements that prevent one agent, or organized collective agency, from being the 'winner who holds all critical power,' whether temporarily or permanently."⁸

And last but not least, PS does not necessarily refer to power sharing solely in states, but also at an international level,⁹ in unions of states (like the European Union,¹⁰ or between the EU and its member states¹¹), in cities,¹² or in political parties.¹³

PS IN THE NARROW SENSE

In the political sciences, the term "PS" is used in the more specific, narrow sense of agreements made and institutionalized in multi-segmental states by political elites originating from various social segments, especially of a national, ethnic, religious, or denominational character. The conceptualization of the term "PS" in this case is well advanced, but that fact does not preclude the existence of differences of interpretation, or the distinguishing of various models as part of PS in the narrow sense.

⁸ B. O'Leary, "Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places...", p. 3.

⁹ M.W. Zacher, "The Conundrums of International Power Sharing: The Politics of Security Council Reform," in: *The United Nations and Global Security*, R.M. Price, M.W. Zacher (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2004, pp. 211–225.

¹⁰ J. van Zeven, "Subsidiarity in European Environmental Law: A Competence Allocation Approach," *Harvard Environmental Law Review*, 2014, Vol. 38, pp. 415–464; I. Mannes, "The Constitutive Nature of Values, Images and Principles in the European Union," in: *Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy*, S. Lucarelli, I. Mannes (eds.), Routledge, London 2006, p. 34.

¹¹ F.J. Campbell, "Power Sharing in the European Union: Has Court of Justice Activism Changed the Balance?," *North East Law Review*, 2013, Vol. 1, pp. 109–139.

¹² R. de Bercegol, *Small Towns and Decentralisation in India: Urban Local Bodies in the Making*, Springer, New Delhi 2017, p. 86.

¹³ W. Cross, "Understanding Power-Sharing within Political Parties: Stratarchy as Mutual Interdependence between the Party in the Centre and the Party on the Ground," *Government and Opposition*, 2018, Vol. 53, Issue 2, pp. 205–230.

In the narrow sense, PS should be seen above all as a *type of political system*.¹⁴ The notion of “political system” includes the structures, organizations, consciousness, culture, relations, values, and norms characteristic of the political community in which the system appears. The basic elements of a political system, however, are its institutions, as represented by a set of rules. A set of specific institutions in turn forms a specific PS model.

For several reasons, PS in the narrow sense should be defined as a political system. First, most of the characteristics of PS extend beyond notions such as “system of government” (e.g., parliamentary, presidential, semi-presidential); “form of government” (e.g., a republic, a monarchy); “political regime” (e.g., democracy, a hybrid regime, authoritarianism); or “territorial organization” (e.g., a unitary state, a federation). Second, having institutions that complement each other for the purpose of reaching a specific aim (peace, political stabilization) is characteristic of PS. Third, PS is based on systematized conceptual bases, that is, on a certain philosophy of thought and action. In this sense, philosophy should be understood as the general principles and ideas upon which the idea of PS rests. It may be assumed that the more such elements of a political system as consciousness, culture, values, and norms are imbued with a philosophy of thought and action typical for PS and the more the political system is based on inter-segmental cooperation, the more the definition of PS as a type of political system will be warranted.

It should be obvious that PS as a political system is not something that exists from the moment when institutions—understood as the sets of rules typical of some PS models—are formed in the legal sense, but rather PS is something that is constantly evolving—not so much institutionally but primarily on the level of consciousness. Thus, PS may be more or less strongly rooted in the consciousness of the elites and other members of individual segments in multi-segmental societies. Moreover, presumably the more segment members, especially the elites, understand the need for a PS system, the greater should be its durability. Consequently, it may be assumed that PS in Switzerland is more developed and,

¹⁴ T.D. Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC 1996, p. 4; Reilly B., *Political Reform and the Demise of Consociationalism in Southeast Asia*, Murdoch University, Research Repository, 2011, p. 8, http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/21774/1/Political_Reform_and_the_Demise_of_Consociationalism_in_Southeast_Asia.pdf [access: April 6, 2018].

at the same time, more enduring, than PS in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It should be noted that while PS as a system should not be understood solely as a set of certain institutions, other elements of the system are very difficult to measure. In this context, it is only by convention that the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina could serve as an example of a nascent PS system.

However, PS can be considered a *strategy aimed at conflict management or resolution* (with a set of accompanying political and legal arrangements) when the political system of a multi-segmental state is not yet marked by a philosophy of thought and action in the spirit of peace and inter-segmental power sharing, that is, when PS-type arrangements are being introduced mechanically as an attempt to end a conflict or in a post-conflict context (for example, as a result of an ad hoc peace agreement ending conflict between two mutually hostile ethnic segments).¹⁵ However, even in such a situation, PS-type arrangements can form a significant part of the political system. A consensual political culture should evolve, and there should be an awareness of the necessity for joint nurturing of the compromises attained.

It should now be asked: What makes PS in the narrow sense a specific type of political system? To answer this question, the following basic elements that make PS into a distinct political system should be indicated:

- PS usually emerges in a context of growing awareness on the part of segmental elites that in a multi-segmental state the tensions and conflicts between segments defined by certain ascribed or cultural criteria – or conflicts between segments and the central government – can not be limited without resorting to systemic PS arrangements. In particular, ongoing conflicts produce an awareness among the elites that relations between segments have to be based on mutual compromises and on norms and values going beyond particular interests;

- The core of PS consists in the inclusion of segmental elites in various structures and levels of power and, as a result, in the decision-making process. PS should be inclusive with regard to all representatives who enjoy broad legitimacy amongst their segments;

- The basis of the decision-making process in PS is political collaboration between the elites of various segments, going beyond

¹⁵ In practice it is often unusually difficult to make a clear distinction between PS as a political system and PS as a strategy whose aim is conflict management or resolution.

the interests of individual segments and attempting to reconcile them. Specific arrangements furthering this collaboration differ depending on the PS model;

- PS may include political arrangements of a formal character, but also those of a non-formal nature, that is, arrangements not guaranteed by the constitution or by other statutory acts of law;

- Although PS exists above all in the political dimension, the sharing of power and, therefore, of influence between segments can also be done in the sphere of the economy (economic PS),¹⁶ the military (military PS),¹⁷ security institutions (PS in security agencies),¹⁸ the justice administration system (PS in the judiciary, judicial PS, PS in the courts),¹⁹ the media (PS in the media),²⁰ and the civil service and administration (PS in the civil service, administrative PS).²¹ The political system is not an isolated entity but is directly

¹⁶ K. Miti, E. Abatan, S. Minou, "Is Power-Sharing a Solution to Africa's Conflicts?," *Southern African Peace and Security Studies*, 2013, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 2; A. Mehler, *Peace and Power Sharing in Africa...*, p. 459; K. Trzciński, "Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia...", p. 179; K. Trzciński, "The Consociational Addition to Indonesia's Centripetalism...", p. 16.

¹⁷ M. Cammett, E. Malesky, "Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies: Implications for Peace and Governance," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2012, Vol. 56, No. 6, p. 990; S. Vandeginste, "Power-Sharing in Burundi: An Enduring Miracle?," in: *Power-Sharing: Empirical and Normative Challenges*, A. McCulloch, J. McGarry (eds.), Routledge, London 2017, p. 169.

¹⁸ A.M. Hersi, "Application of Power-sharing Models in Managing Intractable Clan Conflict in Somalia," *International Journal of Political Science*, 2015, Vol. 2, Issue 1, p. 21.

¹⁹ S. Graziadei, "Power Sharing Courts," *Contemporary Southeastern Europe*, 2016, Vol. 3, Issue 1, p. 66; A.M. Hersi, "Application of Power-sharing Models...", p. 15; S. Wolff, "A Resolvable Frozen Conflict? Designing a Settlement for Transnistria," European Centre for Minority Issues, *ECMI Issue Brief*, 2011, No. 26, p. 7; S. Wolff, "Guarantee Options for a Settlement of the Conflict over Transnistria," European Centre for Minority Issues, *ECMI Working Paper*, 2011, No. 51, p. 11.

²⁰ T. Jusić, L.K. Palmer, "The Media and Power-Sharing: Towards an Analytical Framework for Understanding Media Policies in Post-Conflict Societies: Public Broadcasting in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Global Media Journal—Polish Edition*, 2008, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 119; S. Bašić-Hrvatini, M. Thompson, "Public Service Broadcasting in Plural and Divided Societies," in: *Divided They Fall: Public Service Broadcasting in Multiethnic States*, S. Bašić Hrvatin, M. Thompson, T. Jusić (eds.), Media Center, Sarajevo 2008, pp. 24–38; I.K. Davis, "International News and the Distribution Question: China, Falun Dafa and Pluralism in Canadian Media Policy," *The Political Economy of Communication*, 2016, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 86; L.K. Palmer, *Power-Sharing in Media – Integration of the Public?*, Media Online, 2001, p. 1, <http://www.mediaonline.ba/en/pdf.asp?ID=106&n=POWER-SHARING%20IN%20MEDIA%20-%20INTEGRATION%20OF%20THE%20PUBLIC?> [access: March 23, 2018].

²¹ K. Kupferberg, S. Wolff, "Sudan: 'Successful' Constitutional Reform Spurs Localized Violence," in: *Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa: Preventing Civil War Through Institutional Design*, A.J. Kuperman (ed.), University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2015, p. 102; G.B. Peters, E. Schröter, P. von Maravic, "Representative Bureaucracy: Concept, Driving Forces, Strategies," in: *Representative Bureaucracy in Action: Country*

connected with each of the above-mentioned spheres. Moreover, they all overlap with the political system and have an impact on it.

– In multi-segmental societies conflicts in relations between segments or between them and the central government often occur. PS arrangements that are well designed and respected, ideally by all segments but particularly by the largest and most powerful ones, can be helpful in reconciling different segmental interests and, as a result, in limiting conflicts, especially those of an ethnic, religious, or communal nature.²² The principal advantage of using a PS system, especially one of its main models, or elements of it, is the building of peace and political stability in multi-segmental societies.²³ However, the mere institution of a political system of the PS-type is no guarantee of peace and stability. In this context, it becomes important that those in power in multi-segmental societies achieve success in the resolution of social and economic problems and in building prosperity. In terms of PS effectiveness, the international neighborhood can play a significant role by aiding and, above all, not hampering the implementation and working of arrangements forming the basis of PS (Lebanon is a case in point);

– By allowing members of the political elites of various segments to take part in the decision-making process, PS helps diminish the concentration of power and the benefits derived from it by a segment that is dominant by virtue of its size and/or strength and consequently reduces the arbitrariness of power.²⁴ PS can decrease both the power of the majority, obtained through free

Profiles from the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia, P. von Maravić, B.G. Peters, E. Schröter (eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2013, p. 17; Centre for Public Policy Studies (CPPS), *Towards a More Representative and World Class Malaysian Civil Service*, Kuala Lumpur, 2006, p. 6, <http://cpps.org.my/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Malaysian-Civil-Service-9MP-Recommendations.pdf> [access: April 3, 2018].

²² K. Trzciński, "Co łączy i dzieli 'communal conflict' oraz 'konflikt etniczny'? Analiza znaczeniowa obu terminów i ich nigeryjska egzemplifikacja ["What are the Similarities and Differences between Communal and Ethnic Conflicts? An Analysis of the Meaning of Both Notions and Their Nigerian Exemplification"], *Afryka* 2015, No. 42, pp. 11–30.

²³ K. Trzciński, "Czym jest stabilność polityczna państwa?" ["What is the Political Stability of a State?], *Przegląd Politologiczny* 2015, No. 2, pp. 37–47.

²⁴ Even institutions of so-called majoritarian democracy are frequently unable to ease inter-segmental relations in multi-segmental states. For more on this subject, see K. Wiredu, *Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington IN 1996, pp. 172, 176–178; K. Wiredu, *Society and Democracy in Africa*, in: *Explorations in African Political Thought: Identity, Community, Ethics*, T. Kiros (ed.), Routledge, New York 2001, pp. 178–181; K. Wiredu, *Tradition, Democracy and Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Africa*, in: *Rewriting Africa: Toward Renaissance or Collapse?*, E. Kurimoto (ed.), The Japan Center for Area Studies, Osaka 2001, p. 163.

elections in a democracy or in a hybrid regime,²⁵ and authoritarian power (as was long the case in Nigeria, for example). In authoritarian conditions, the so-called collusion or cartel of elites can form the basis for PS-type arrangements. It can not be ruled out that PS helps with democratization (this may be the case in Nigeria today), or in attaining good governance (as may be the case in Northern Ireland, for example). It should be borne in mind, however, that in the case of certain multi-segmental states, PS may be the very basis for their functioning (again, Lebanon is a case in point). In such a situation, democratization, good governance, or various social and economic ills are of secondary importance, at least at the initial PS-arrangement stage. That does not mean they are of no significance with regard to attaining a number of fundamental goals, like peace in inter-segmental relations and political stability in a multi-segmental state.

Although the real functioning of PS (understood as a political system or conflict management/resolution strategy) is frequently analyzed as involving a set of institutions, especially of a formal type, it should more often be treated as a philosophy of thought and action applied in real-life conditions and serving to reach lasting peace and political stability. If PS is seen primarily from this perspective, rather than as a set of institutions alone, then analysis of its deeper systemic traits, including such elements of the political system as consciousness, culture, relations, values, and norms, will be easier.

In addition to being a political system or conflict management/resolution strategy, PS is also an empirical and normative theory. The empirical theory identifies an existing political system or conflict management/resolution strategy of a PS nature, with its specific political institutions, and analyzes them from various angles. Analyzing PS effectiveness in terms of its aims is particularly important in this regard. The normative theory proposes new or improved, presumably optimal, solutions, even though it rests in part on those already in place and on experience of their use. Not infrequently, it is a response to the shortcomings and drawbacks of the existing PS system.

In order to effectively distinguish the term “PS” in the narrow sense from its broad-sense counterpart in the literature, it is often associated with an adjective. Terms like the following are

²⁵ B. O’Leary, “Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places...”, pp. 2–3.

used when PS is used in connection with segments of an ethnic or similar character: “ethnic PS,”²⁶ “interethnic PS,”²⁷ “ethno-national PS,”²⁸ “cross-national PS,”²⁹ “cross-ethnic PS,”³⁰ “inter-tribal PS,”³¹ “ethno-tribal PS,”³² “clan-based PS,”³³ “cross-cultural PS,”³⁴ and “PS between linguistic groups.”³⁵ When PS is connected with segments of a religious or similar nature, the terms “religious PS,”³⁶

²⁶ S. Vandeginste, “Governing Ethnicity after Genocide: Ethnic Amnesia in Rwanda versus Ethnic Power-Sharing in Burundi,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 2014, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 263; N.-C. Bormann, “The Causes and Consequences of Ethnic Power-Sharing,” National Centre of Competence in Research, *NCCR Working Paper*, 2014, No. 83, p. 1; P. Norris, *Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?*, 2005, p. 9, https://wcfa.harvard.edu/files/wcfa/files/864_powersharing_solutions.pdf [access: March 11, 2018].

²⁷ D.L. Horowitz, “Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems,” *Journal of Democracy*, 2014, Vol. 25, Issue 2, p. 5; M. Brusis, “The European Union and Interethnic Power-Sharing Arrangements in Accession Countries,” *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 2015, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 60; B. O’Leary, “Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places...”, p. 24.

²⁸ B. O’Duffy, “The Nation-State and Nationalism,” in: *Comparative Politics: Explaining Democratic Systems*, J. Bara, M. Pennington (eds.), SAGE, London 2009, p. 89; J. Thomson, R. Kennedy, C. Pierson, “Challenging Identity Hierarchies: Consociational Power-Sharing and Gendered Political Representation,” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 2016, Vol. 18, Issue 3, p. 626.

²⁹ J. McGarry, “Conclusion: What Explains the Performance of Power-Sharing Settlements?,” in: *Power-Sharing...*, A. McCulloch, J. McGarry (eds.), p. 274.

³⁰ J. Fraenkel, “Mandatory Power-Sharing in Coup-Prone Fiji,” in: A. McCulloch, J. McGarry (eds.), *Power-Sharing...*, p. 103; S.A. Bollens, *Governing Polarized Cities*, in: J. McEvoy, B. O’Leary (eds.), *Power Sharing...*, p. 345.

³¹ L.T. Vinson, *Religion, Violence, and Local Power-Sharing in Nigeria*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2017, p. 111; P. Emmerson, *From Majority Rule to Inclusive Politics: Electing a Power-Sharing Coalition*, Springer, Cham 2016, p. 49.

³² L.T. Vinson, *Religion, Violence, and Local Power-Sharing in Nigeria...*, p. 250.

³³ A.H. Hersi, “Application of Power-Sharing Models...”, p. 10.

³⁴ B. O’Leary, “Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places...”, p. 5.

³⁵ M. Cinalli, “Below and Beyond Power Sharing: Relational Structures across Institutions and Civil Society,” in: *Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies*, I. O’Flynn, D. Russell (eds.), Pluto Press, London 2005, p. 182; M. Koenig, “Social Conditions for the Implementation of Linguistic Human Rights through Multicultural Policies: The Case of the Kyrgyz Republic,” in: *Language Policy and Language Issues in the Successor States of the Former USSR, Multilingual Matters*, S. Wright (ed.), Clevedon 2000, p. 75.

³⁶ F. Alicino, “Religions and Ethno-Religious Differences in Bosnia and Herzegovina: From Laboratories of Hate to Peaceful Reconciliation,” *Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale*, 2016, No. 37, p. 9; P. Kingston, M.-J. Zahar, “Rebuilding ‘A House of Many Mansions’: The Rise and Fall of Militia Cantons in Lebanon,” in: *States-Within-States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post-Cold War Era*, P. Kingston, I.S. Spears (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2004, p. 83; L.V. Aragon, “Elite Competition in Central Sulawesi,” in: *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, H.S. Nordholt, G. van Klinken (eds.), Brill, Leiden 2014, p. 56; B. Khawaja, *War and Memory: The Role of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, Macalester, History Honors Projects, 2011, Paper 13, p. 10, http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/history_honors/13 [access: March 19, 2018].

“sectarian PS,”³⁷ “inter-sectarian PS,”³⁸ and “cross-sectarian PS”³⁹ may appear.

In the literature the term “PS” is also found accompanied by an adjective and used in connection with PS in the narrow sense, such as in “ethno-religious PS,”⁴⁰ and “ethno-sectarian PS,”⁴¹ which refer to situations in which “PS” used for ethnic or similar segments is combined with “PS” used for religious or similar communities.

Other terms related to segmental divisions are also used in the literature, especially “ethno-regional PS,”⁴² “segmental PS,”⁴³ “inter-segmental PS,”⁴⁴ and “corporate PS.”⁴⁵ The last of these

³⁷ S. Rosiny, “Power Sharing in Syria: Lessons from Lebanon’s Experience,” German Institute of Global and Area Studies, *GIGA Working Papers*, 2013, No. 223, p. 17; I. Salamey, “Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options,” *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 2009, Vol. 14, No. 2, p. 83; S. Makdissi, M. Marktanner, “Trapped By Consociationalism: The Case of Lebanon,” *Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies*, 2009, Vol. 11, p. 1.

³⁸ N. Stel, W. Naudé, “Public-Private Entanglement: Entrepreneurship in Lebanon’s Hybrid Political Order,” *The Journal of Development Studies*, 2016, Vol. 52, No. 2, p. 258.

³⁹ R. Hinnebusch, “Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory and the Middle East: An Overview and Critique,” *Democratization*, 2006, Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 389; M. Eisenstadt, *The Rise of ISIL: Iraq and Beyond (Part II)*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2014, p. 3, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/EisenstadtTestimony20140715.pdf> [access: March 20, 2018].

⁴⁰ S. Makdissi, “Rebuilding Without Resolution: The Lebanese Economy and State in the Post-Civil War Period,” American University of Beirut, Institute of Financial Economics, *Lecture and Working Paper Series*, 2007, No. 3, p. 39; E. Berman, *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism*, The MIT Press, Cambridge MA 2009, p. 52.

⁴¹ P. Shirlow, “Truth Friction in Northern Ireland: Caught between Apologia and Humiliation,” *Parliamentary Affairs*, 2018, Vol. 71, Issue 2, p. 417; M. Knights, “The Long Haul: Rebooting U.S. Security Cooperation in Iraq,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *Policy Focus*, 2015, No. 137, p. 4, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus137_Knights4.pdf [access: April 4, 2018].

⁴² B. Kendhammer, “Getting Our Piece of the National Cake: Consociational Power Sharing and Neopatrimonialism in Nigeria,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 2015, Vol. 21, No. 1, p. 159; R.T. Suberu, “Nigeria’s Muddled Elections,” in: *Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat*, L. Diamond, M.F. Plattner (eds.), Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2010, p. 128; R. Suberu, L. Diamond, “Institutional Design, Ethnic Conflict-Management and Democracy in Nigeria,” in: *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, A. Reynolds (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002, p. 421.

⁴³ R.P. Bellamy, *Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics of Compromise*, Routledge, London 1999, p. 119.

⁴⁴ J. Coakley, “Implementing Consociation in Northern Ireland,” in: *Consociational Theory: McGarry and O’Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict*, R. Taylor (ed.), Routledge, London 2009, p. 124; K. Trzciński, “Centripetal Spatial Vote Distribution Requirement in Presidential Elections: Cases of Nigeria and Indonesia,” *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia*, 2017, Vol. 30, Issue 1: K. Trzciński (ed.), *Special Issue on Power-Sharing in Asia and Oceania*, p. 90.

⁴⁵ J. Nagle, “Beyond Ethnic Entrenchment and Amelioration: An Analysis of Non-Sectarian Social Movements and Lebanon’s Consociationalism,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2018, Vol. 41, Issue 7, p. 1374; J. McGarry, “Conclusion...”, p. 281; B. Baliqi, “Promoting Multi-Ethnicity or Maintaining a Divided Society: Dilemmas of Power-Sharing in Kosovo,” *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 2018, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 55.

stands in direct opposition to liberal PS, or more specifically, to liberal consociationalism, which assumes, among other things, the existence side by side of institutions nurturing group rights and supra-group institutions referring to individuals or to society as a whole, and not to ethnic or religious segments.⁴⁶

Liberal PS can be seen as a type of bridge between PS in the broad sense and PS in the narrow sense. Of a similar type is the PS already discussed in this article: the result of a peace agreement between the parties to a conflict, if the parties to it are, in some part, ethnic or religious segments, and the main elements of the PS arrangement are institutions characteristic for one of the models of PS in the narrow sense. These examples indicate how difficult it can be at times to make a clear distinction between PS in the broad sense and PS in the narrow sense.

CONSOCIATIONAL, CENTRIPETAL (INTEGRATIVE), AND HYBRID POWER SHARING

Although the main aim of this article is not to discuss specific models of PS in the narrow sense, the most important of the models should be mentioned, at least briefly, because PS in the narrow sense can also be understood in different ways.

In particular, even though the literature usually considers PS in the consociational form to be simply one of the models of PS in the narrow sense (presumably the best known, studied, and conceptualized), in some of the literature PS is seen as synonymous with consociationalism. The authors who use the term in this manner seem not to recognize centripetalism (integrative PS), for example, as a PS model, because they see PS and consociationalism as being one and the same.

That centripetalism should also be recognized as a model of PS in the narrow sense can even be deduced: for instance, through analogy to the understanding of the term “PS” in the broad sense. In keeping with the latter, power in a state can be divided between various entities in various ways. For example, power within the

⁴⁶ A. McCulloch, “Consociational Settlements in Deeply Divided Societies: The Liberal-Corporate Distinction,” *Democratization*, 2014, Vol. 21, Issue 3, pp. 501–518; Cf. B.F. Salloukh, R.A. Verheij, “Transforming Power Sharing: From Corporate to Hybrid Consociation in Postwar Lebanon,” *Middle East Law and Interdisciplinary Governance Journal*, 2017, Vol. 9, pp. 147–173.

framework of the government of a given state can be divided between men and women belonging to the same political party. Similarly, individuals who are members of different ethnic groups or religious communities (among other entities) may belong to one of the key centripetal institutions—supra-regional and supra-ethnic parties—and thus participate in the exercise of power. As in the context of PS in the broad sense, various entities that share power are allowed to participate in the decision-making process. Thus—and this is characteristic of both consociationalism and centripetalism—PS in the narrow sense makes it possible for members of different segments defined primarily in ascriptive and cultural terms to share power. As PS models in the narrow sense, consociationalism and centripetalism were formulated for states with multi-segmental societies, especially deeply divided ones. Their method of PS is primarily to favor, albeit in different ways, members of segments distinguished by ascriptive and cultural criteria: nations and ethnic groups on the one hand, and religious and denominational communities on the other.⁴⁷

Moreover, PS occurs within the framework of a given model's main institutions, which may be assisted by auxiliary institutions of a formal or informal nature, in keeping with the philosophy of the model.

On the one hand, these elements are common to consociationalism and centripetalism (the two main PS models in the narrow sense) and, on the other, they distinguish them from PS between groups whose separateness is based on other criteria (such as gender), that is, in the spirit of PS in the broad sense.

And last but not least, if PS in the narrow sense were to be limited solely to consociationalism, there would be no need to make use of both names for the purpose of defining the same model of political system.

Even though two main types of PS in the narrow sense—consociationalism and centripetalism—are usually distinguished in the literature, they are most often treated as opposites.

The philosophy of consociationalism rests in large measure on the recognition of group rights. In the context of PS in the narrow sense, such groups, or segments, are primarily nations, ethnic

⁴⁷ But PS in the narrow sense may also allow segments created on other bases to take part in the exercise of power, as, for example, in liberal consociationalism. See A. McCulloch, *Consociational Settlements...*, pp. 501–518.

groups, and religious and denominational communities forming part of multi-segmental societies and not infrequently inhabiting a given territory in compact settlements. In the spirit of consociationalism, ethnic/national⁴⁸ or religious/denominational segments should be entitled to certain particular rights by virtue of their possession and articulation of group interests. According to Stuart J. Kaufman,⁴⁹ the most important group interests, distinguished on an ascriptive or cultural basis, include linguistic, religious, and economic interests. The task of consociational institutions is to protect and reinforce group interests. The protection of those interests implies the maintenance of a status quo, such as economic benefits, for example. Reinforcing group interests means making them more durable.

The philosophy of consociationalism entails the belief that one's interests are never better served than by oneself. The essence of consociationalism can thus be said to be the assumption that, in a multi-segmental society, especially one that is deeply divided, individual segments, as interest groups of sorts, should have their own representation in the state power structure and a role in political decision-making. In consequence, group interests are best served by consociational—ideally, formally entrenched—institutions, such as ethnic, communal, or segmental parties forming grand coalitions; segmental autonomy; proportionality in elections; division of positions in the government, public agencies, or army; and a minority veto right. It is best if the decision-making process rests on a consensual approach to issues by segmental representatives, even though attaining such a consensus is often difficult and time consuming. Although consociational institutions protect the interests of individual segments, they may also increase awareness of the benefits, in a consociational political system, of belonging to a segment and consequently may reinforce segmental identities and politicize ethnicity.

The philosophy of centripetalism has a more limited relationship with group rights. As a type of PS, centripetalism, like consociationalism, is intended to assure members of various segments of a share in power—not as part of particular institutions protecting and reinforcing the interests of individual segments, but

⁴⁸ Including linguistic segments.

⁴⁹ S.J. Kaufman, "Ethnicity as a Generator of Conflict," in: *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, K. Cordell, S. Wolff (eds.), Routledge, London 2011, pp. 91, 94–95.

in the dimension of supra-segmental, or inter-segmental institutions, that is, institutions that are open to individuals from all segments. Such an approach is primarily aimed at nurturing integrative political behavior among members of the political elites across segmental divisions in a manner that transcends group interests and that depoliticizes, overcomes, and reduces the significance of segmental differences.⁵⁰

Centripetalism, in contrast to consociationalism, does not promote institutional recognition of segmental differences and interests. Quite the contrary, the essence of centripetalism is to foster cooperation not so much between segments as between members of different segments, and even *sui generis* to force them to cooperate by creating an integrative institutional framework. The principal formal centripetal institutions include supra-regional and inter-segmental parties and, should the need arise, coalitions between them; decentralization leading to a division of large segments into smaller parts that inhabit different—ideally multi-segmental—states or provinces, thus inclining regional political elites of different segments to collaborate with one another; the election of a supra-segmental president (supported by members of various segments) through the use of the so-called territorial vote-distribution requirement, that is, the need to win an appropriately large number of votes in presidential elections in the majority of states or provinces (meeting this requirement is indispensable for occupying the presidential office, and merely winning a numerical majority of votes is insufficient);⁵¹ and preferential voting in parliamentary elections (especially to the lower chamber) in the form of either a single transferable vote or an alternative vote, through the ranking of candidates, which makes it possible for voters to indicate preferences among candidates of different parties.⁵²

⁵⁰ B. Reilly, *Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, especially pp. 83–91; B. Reilly, “Centripetalism,” in: K. Cordell and S. Wolff (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict...*, especially pp. 291–295; B. Reilly, “Centripetalism: Cooperation, Accommodation and Integration,” in: S. Wolff, C. Yakinthou (eds.), *Conflict Management in Divided Societies: Theories and Practice*, Routledge, New York 2011, pp. 57–65.

⁵¹ K. Trzciński, “Centripetal Spatial Vote Distribution Requirement...”, pp. 89–107.

⁵² In the case of centripetalism, the aim of such voting would be to reduce the chances of the election to parliament of politicians showing little restraint in their political views and actions, particularly with regard to inter-segmental relations. Preferential voting systems functioned for a time in Sri Lanka, Fiji, and in Papua New Guinea, among other places. See B. Reilly, *Democracy and Diversity...*, pp. 115–118; A. McCulloch, “Does Moderation Pay? Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Societies,” *Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review*

To summarize, centripetalism shapes conditions for integration, that is, it reduces differences between members of various segments and, by so doing, creates a more cohesive whole from many parts. Consociationalism is more akin to a policy of accommodation:⁵³ the political recognition of differences and the mutual adaptation of segments to one another. PS accommodation arrangements are those that meet the segments' aspirations to have their own distinct institutions and that create conditions enabling the protection of the segments' interests.⁵⁴

Centripetalism, like consociationalism, also has disadvantages. Just as consociationalism can reinforce group identities, centripetalism can mainly protect the interests of the principal segment,⁵⁵ or segments,⁵⁶ in the state.

It is perhaps in part for this reason that institutions proper to both main PS models are not infrequently combined in one political system. At first glance, consociationalism and centripetalism are difficult to reconcile. This does not mean, however, that institutions according to one or the other model can not coexist in one state. Just as right-wing and left-wing political parties can share power in a state by forming a governing coalition (in PS in the broad sense), so consociational and centripetal institutions can function side by side in the same multi-segmental society in PS in the narrow sense. Together, they form a third PS model in the narrow sense, which I propose to call "hybrid power sharing" (HPS). It is a model enabling both integration and accommodation.

In short, HPS is a real type of inter-segmental PS system, which includes elements that can be referred to as heterogenic, as they originate with PS models that have different conceptual bases. But as can be seen in practice, the elements of one of the PS models, centripetalism or consociationalism, are always dominant in a HPS

of *Ethnopolitics*, 2013, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 111–132; A. McCulloch, "The Track Record of Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Places," in: J. McEvoy, B. O'Leary (eds.), *Power-Sharing...*, pp. 94–111.

⁵³ B. O'Leary, "Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places...", p. 19.

⁵⁴ Alan J. Kuperman, "Designing Constitutions to Reduce Domestic Conflict," in: A.J. Kuperman (ed.), *Constitutions and Conflict Management in Africa...*, p. 6.

⁵⁵ In Indonesia, for example, there is one main ethnic group—the Javanese, and one common religious community—Muslims, the majority of whom are Sunnis.

⁵⁶ In Nigeria, for example, there are three main ethnic groups—the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Igbo, and two main religious communities—Muslims and Christians (mainly Protestants).

system. HPS can be found in Indonesia⁵⁷ and Nigeria,⁵⁸ for example. Centripetal elements are dominant in the political systems of both countries, but they are enhanced by consociational institutions.

The political systems of Nigeria and Indonesia are the best examples of HPS. Most PS institutions in Nigeria and Indonesia are characteristic of centripetalism. These institutions are a centripetal territorial structure made up of multi-segmental states or provinces; the election of a supra-segmental president through the use of a territorial vote distribution requirement; and supra-regional and inter-ethnic political parties.

In Nigeria, centripetal institutions are complemented with consociational solutions, which are understood either as a type of grand coalition in Lijphart's understanding of the term (so-called "universal participation," or a "cartel of elites"),⁵⁹ or as an emanation of the principle of proportionality, especially in the political representation, or a type of economic PS. These solutions are, above all: 1) the formal requirement, de facto of a parity type, for the cabinet to have a multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition; 2) the informal principle of rotating the presidency between Muslims and Christians; 3) the informal principle in keeping with which the vice-presidency is given to a member of a different religious community and ethnic group than that from which the president originates; 4) the federal government's return of part of the revenues derived from the exploitation of energy resources to a number of states in the south of Nigeria (the Niger Delta).⁶⁰

In Indonesia, in addition to the main centripetal institutions, the following consociational institutions are in place: 1) special autonomy for the provinces of Aceh, Papua, and West Papua (one of the most important elements of such autonomy is the application

⁵⁷ K. Trzciński, "Hybrid Power-Sharing in Indonesia...", pp. 168–185; K. Trzciński, "The Consociational Addition to Indonesia's Centripetalism...", pp. 5–20.

⁵⁸ K. Trzciński, "How Theoretically Opposite Models of Interethnic Power Sharing Can Complement Each Other...", pp. 53–73.

⁵⁹ A. Lijphart, *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice*, Routledge, London 2008, p. 29. See also R. Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany*, Doubleday, Garden City, NY 1967, p. 276.

⁶⁰ R.T. Suberu, "Federalism and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: The Nigerian Experience," in: *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*, D. Turton (ed.), James Currey, Oxford 2006, pp. 75–76; S.A. Rustad, "Power-Sharing and Conflict in Nigeria: Power-Sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes," *Center for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, CSCW Papers*, Oslo 2008, pp. 19–22.

in Aceh of *sharia* law, which is not in force in other parts of Indonesia);⁶¹ 2) economic PS arrangements, in keeping with which the provinces of Aceh, Papua, and West Papua retain the lion's share of revenues generated by the exploitation of those provinces' natural resources; 3) segmental parties—religious ones within the territory of the entire state, and ethnic ones in the province of Aceh. These institutions are emanations of consociational autonomy for segments and recognition for group rights.

The reason for the emergence and continued existence of HPS (that is, a mix of various elements from different PS models in one multi-segmental state) is rather simple: It's a combination of need and interest. The elites of a given segment may feel either a strong desire for guaranteed rights to something (to have ethnic-based parties, for example) or that they lack such guarantees. Obtaining the right to something is seen as favorable for the segment in question (for example, it is assumed that ethnic parties will better meet the needs of the segment than inter-ethnic parties). In each case, however, the need for HPS may be different—it may be articulated by the elites of one or more segments and refer to different PS dimensions. The implementation of HPS follows negotiations and is the result of a satisfactory arrangement for both sides. For example, the introduction of certain consociational elements to a political system dominated by centripetal institutions enhances centripetalism in those areas where it proves inadequate to produce a stabilizing effect. For example, the benefits from the use of consociational institutions in conditions where centripetal institutions are dominant can also be derived by the central authorities, because providing a given segment the PS institutions it needs can put an end to a long-lasting and costly conflict, as was the case in the Indonesian province of Aceh, among other places. The combination of centripetal and consociational elements should thus produce a stabilizing effect where centripetalism or consociationalism alone are insufficient.

⁶¹ In the case of the provinces of Papua and West Papua, special autonomy has been introduced only in part. See K. Trzciński, "The Consociational Addition to Indonesia's Centripetalism...", pp. 5–20.

CONCLUSIONS

Terminology is unusually important in scholarship, as it facilitates discussion. Debate between political scientists, however, is at times made more difficult because certain terms have not been precisely defined. During conferences it happens that scholars exchange views using terms which they understand in disparate ways: for example, they broaden or narrow a term's most frequently encountered meaning. A similar situation often occurs in collective works devoted to a specific issue, when the various authors make use of the same term but understand it differently. Of course, terms at times have many meanings, but very frequently they are simply understood differently. Just as often a related problem can be seen, namely, calling the same phenomenon or process by diverse terms. The lack of terms to adequately define certain new or recently noticed phenomena or processes is a separate issue. In consequence, one of the major problems in contemporary political science involves, on the one hand, the lack of terminological clarity, that is, the lack of a universal terminological grid, and on the other, a terminological deficiency. An absence of terminological order also characterizes the question of PS.

In this article, I sought to make a clear distinction between the broad and narrow meanings of the term "PS." In one sense, the term is very broad and can be used in connection with the participation of various groups or institutional entities in some form of power. In the horizontal dimension it can encompass power sharing by, for example, various political parties; political parties with institutionalized non-party entities, such as various social organizations and movements; between the sexes; between the parties to a conflict, such as rebel organizations and the government; and also between the political elite and citizens. In the vertical dimension the term can be used in connection with power sharing between the central/federal government and regional governments or local government institutions.

PS in the narrow sense has been better theoretized and refers to the sharing of state power in multi-segmental societies (especially deeply divided ones) by segments defined in keeping with cultural and ascriptive criteria, especially nations (in the sociological sense), ethnic groups, religious communities, and denominational communities. PS in the narrow sense is also reflected in mainly

formal institutions. The latter allow members of various segments to participate in the exercise of power, facilitate understanding between them, and, in consequence, contribute to reaching and maintaining peace and political stability in multi-segmental states. Most theoreticians seem to be in agreement about the main institutions that are typical for PS in the narrow sense. The attribution of given institutions to either the consociational or centripetal model (type) depends on which of these they correspond to conceptually. The term “PS” in the narrow sense encompasses two main elements: 1) power sharing in multi-segmental societies, in which segments are defined using cultural and ascriptive criteria; and 2) the functioning of a specific set of institutions furthering the maintenance of peaceful relations between these segments – or between them and the central government – and stabilizing the political situation in the state.

It can be assumed that the less a given political system has traits of PS in the narrow sense (only some institutions are typical of a specific PS model) the more it is justifiable to speak only of the presence of certain PS elements and not of PS as a political system. According to the literature on the subject,⁶² consociationalism as an (almost) full model, or with only certain consociational elements, exists or existed in Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Fiji, the Netherlands, India, Northern Ireland, Columbia, Lebanon (confessional model), Macedonia, Malaysia, Republic of South Africa, Ruanda, South Tyrol, Switzerland, and Cyprus, among other countries or regions. Centripetalism is, or was, associated in particular with Nigeria, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Papua New Guinea. HPS functions in some of the countries mentioned, especially in Nigeria and Indonesia. In addition, consociational and centripetal elements are or were present side by side in Burundi, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia, and Fiji, among other countries.

Although the main consociational and centripetal institutions have been identified in the literature, full consociationalism is

⁶² See, for example, J. McGarry, B. O’Leary, “Power-Sharing Executives: Consociational and Centripetal Formulae and the Case of Northern Ireland,” in: *Power-Sharing...*, A. McCulloch, J. McGarry (eds.), p. 66; B. O’Leary, “Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments,” in: *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies*, S. Noel (ed.), McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal 2005, p. 3; P. Norris, *Stable Democracy and Good Governance in Divided Societies...*, p. 6; S. Wolff, K. Cordell, “Power Sharing,” in: *Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict...*, K. Cordell, S. Wolff (eds.), p. 300; A. McCulloch, “Does Moderation Pay?...” p. 112.

encountered only rarely in practice and centripetalism in the pure sense does not exist at all. Full theoretical models, that is, those that include all the institutions attributed to them, are usually abstract, or ideal propositions, even if they are in large measure empirically based. In the real-life conditions of multi-segmental societies, the institutions characteristic of any of the theoretical PS models are rarely all present, or only certain of their variants have been introduced, and these often depart from pure theoretical premises.

In contrast, the HPS model is solidly rooted in practice, and combines chosen consociational and centripetal institutions, without any a priori assumptions about which consociational and centripetal institutions are included and in what proportion. Naturally, institutions of one PS model are always dominant in a HPS system: for example, centripetal institutions in Nigeria and Indonesia. HPS is not conceptually dogmatic, as are the theoretized consociational and centripetal models. HPS is an elemental model, open to various arrangements and the needs of the moment. Significantly, HPS is effective in that it produces peace and political stability, as opposed to concordance with some pure theoretical requirements, which are few in its case. The existence of HPS indicates that an ultimate definition of PS in the narrow sense remains elusive.