Skip to main navigation menu Skip to main content Skip to site footer
RP-N baner

No. 25/1 (2017)

Articles

The German ‘Civic’ Approach and the Russian ‘Militant’ Approach as Factors of Strategic Orientation in the Context of International Security

DOI: https://doi.org/10.35757/RPN.2017.25.07
Submitted: October 8, 2020
Published: April 28, 2017

Abstract

Germany and Russia are key players in the area of security policy, particularly in Europe but also outside the continent. The two countries, however, show completely different approaches to specific issues. While Russia (like many other powers) quite openly continues to conduct traditional ‘realistic’ diplomacy guided mainly by national interests, Germany is a ‘champion of multilateralism’ that refers to the ‘interests of all humanity’. This remarkable altruism of the nation state has its origin in the history of National Socialism, which, according to the German political élite, delegitimized the concept and the policy of ‘national interest’. As a result of this peculiar political culture, Germany is indeed a reliable partner in NATO, the European Union and other organizations. However, in political practice, the neurotic attitude of the German élite with regard to military affairs often makes cooperation with its partners difficult in the area of security and defence. This attitude has also severely affected the condition of the Bundeswehr and led to disregard for the interests of German soldiers in peacekeeping missions. In contrast, Russia (again) has never reviewed its Stalinist past and the social position of the army is as high as it was in Soviet times. As a result, the country may be less sympathetic than Germany and lacks civic culture, but the cynical policy of Moscow is somewhat more predictable when it comes to hard politics.

References

  1. Baumann R., Hellmann G., Germany and the Use of Military Force: „Total War”, the „Culture of Restraint”, and the Quest for Normality, „German Politics” 2007, nr 10/1, s. 61-82.
  2. Brzeziński Z., The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York 1997.
  3. Brzeziński Z., Wielka szachownica. Główne cele polityki amerykańskiej, przeł. T. Wyżyński, Wydawnictwo Bertelsmann Media, Warszawa 1998.
  4. Chalmers M., Beyond the Alliance System, „World Policy Journal” 1990, nr 2, s. 215-250.
  5. Chomsky N., The New Military Humanism. Lessons from Kosovo, Pluto Press, London 1999.
  6. Covington, S.R. The Culture of Strategic Thought Behind Russia’s Modern Approaches to Warfare, Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (październik 2016) http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Culture%20of%20Strategic%20Thought%203.pdf (dostęp 27 listopada 2016).
  7. Creuzberger S., Stalinismus und Erinnerungskultur, „Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte” 2011, nr 49–50, s. 42-47.
  8. Geis A., Die Zivilmacht Deutschland und die Enttabuisierung des Militärischen (HSFK Standpunkte 2005, nr 2), Frankfurt am Main 2005.
  9. Habermas J., The Postnational Constellation. Political Essays, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass 2001.
  10. Harnisch S., Maull H.W.(red.), Germany as a Civilian Power. The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, Manchester University Press, Manchester 2001.
  11. Hockerts H.G., Wiedergutmachung in Germany. Balancing Historical Accounts, 1945–2005, w: D. Diner, G. Wunberg (red.), Restitution and Memory. Material Restoration in Europe, Berghahn Books, New York – Oxford 2007, s. 323-381.
  12. Itzkowitz Shifrinson J.R., Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion, „International Security” 2016, t. 40, nr 4, s. 7-44, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00236 (dostęp 28 listopada 2016).
  13. Jesse E., Löw K. (red.), Vergangenheitsbewältigung, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin 1997.
  14. Jonsson O., Seely R., Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal After Ukraine, „The Journal of Slavic Military Studies” 2015, nr 1, s. 1-22.
  15. Kałążna K., Rosicki R., O interesie narodowym i racji stanu – rozważania teoretyczne, „Przegląd Politologiczny” 2013, nr 1, s. 119-128.
  16. Kearns G., Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009. Knabe H., Tag der Befreiung? Das Kriegsende in Ostdeutschland, Propyläen, Berlin 2005.
  17. Loth W., Helmut Kohl und die Währungsunion, „Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte” 2013, t. 61, nr 4, s. 455-480.
  18. Mathers J.G., Reform and the Russian Military, w: T. Farrell, T. Terriff (red.), The Sources of Military Change. Culture, Politics, Technology, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder – London 2002, rozdz. 8, s. 161-184.
  19. Maull H.W., Deutschland als Zivilmacht, w: S. Schmidt, G. Hellmann, R. Wolf (red.), Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2007, s. 73-84.
  20. Naumann K., The Battle over „Innere Führung”, w: J. S. Corum (red.), Rearming Germany, Brill, Leiden Boston 2011, s. 205-220.
  21. Nye J.S., Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, New York 2004.
  22. Pietrzyk-Reeves D., Idea społeczeństwa obywatelskiego: Współczesna debata i jej źródła, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń 2012.
  23. Sherlock T., Confronting the Stalinist Past: The Politics of Memory in Russia, „The Washington Quarterly” 2011, nr 2, s. 93-109.
  24. Shlykov P., Russian Foreign Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean since 1991, w: S. N. Litsas, A. Tziampiris (red.), The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Politics and Power, Routledge, Abingdon – New York 2016, rozdz. 3, s. 31-49.
  25. Sprengel R., Kritik der Geopolitik. Ein deutscher Diskurs 1914–1944, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1996.
  26. Spruyt H., Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition, Cornell University Press, Ithaka, NY 2005, s. 81-82.
  27. Szászdi L.F., Russian Civil-military Relations and the Origins of the Second Chechen War, University Press of America, Lanham – Plymouth 2008.
  28. Tewes H., Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe: Enlarging NATO and the European Union, Palgrave, Basingstoke 2002, s. 140-197.
  29. Timmermann-Levanas A., Richter A., Die reden – wir sterben. Wie unsere Soldaten zu Opfern der deutschen Politik werden, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 2010.
  30. Umland A., Russia’s Strategy: Look Scarier Than You Are, „The National Interest”, czerwiec 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-strategy-look-scarier-you-are-16517 (dostęp: 25 pażdziernika 2016).
  31. Von Bredow W., Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine Einführung, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2008, s. 220-221.
  32. Von Rimscha R., Ein Land tut sich schwer: Bundeswehr-Einsätze seit 1991, w: Ch. Schwegmann (red.), Bewährungsproben einer Nation. Die Entsendung der Bundeswehr ins Ausland, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2011, s. 65-76.
  33. Zagorski A., The Limits of a Global Consensus on Security: the Case of Russia, w: L. Peral (red.), Global Security in a Multipolar World, Chaillot Paper nr 118, październik 2009, rozdz. 5, s. 67-84, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp118.pdf (dostęp: 27 listopada 2016).

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Similar Articles

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 > >> 

You may also start an advanced similarity search for this article.