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Tom 11 (2009): Special issue

Numer specjalny

Libertas et Falsum

DOI: https://doi.org/10.35757/CIV.2009.11.12
Przesłane: 9 lipca 2020
Opublikowane: 30.01.2009

Abstrakt

Why has the political sphere appeared so conducive to falsehood and liars throughout the ages? What is the source of acquiescence to the presence of falsehood in politics on the part of both public opinion and  philosophers? An attempt to answer this question, among many others, was undertaken by Hannah Arendt, when she reflected on the status of truth within philosophy and politics. Fact that one cannot dispute truth becomes an insurmountable problem in the mutual relationship between politics and truth. The truth doesn’t take privileged position within the political realm. Its foundation is made by opinions that are always formed within a discourse and refer to facts, and it is an agreement of the majority, not the absolute validity, that decides on the outcome of a debate between opinions. In light of this, however outrageous it might seem, Arendt sees unlimited possibilities for the lie, which are due to the nature of facts; their contingency allows for the whole of the public realm to be different from what it is. Equally surprising is the conclusion that telling the truth about facts does not lead to action and, by the same token, is not an act of freedom. Action, and the experience of freedom achieved through action, are born almost exclusively through the lie.

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