The article presents the political nature of Benedict Spinoza’s ontological system using the example of the concept of conatus (desire). The author defends the coherence of the Dutch thinker’s thought, arguing with Leszek Kołakowski’s interpretation, according to which Spinoza’s system is characterised by the insurmountable antinomies of an individual and the infinite. As the article shows, noticing the fundamentally political character of Spinoza’s ontological notions makes it possible to transcend these antinomies towards a coherent and clear interpretation. While focusing on the notion of conatus, the author analyses two of Kołakowski’s antinomies. The first concerns the problem of duration and individuality, and presents the contradiction between the principle of the self-preservation of individuals and the indivisibility of substance. The second touches upon a strictly ethical issue – the alleged incompatibility between striving to preserve oneself in one’s being and striving for the intellectual love of God. The author shows that both antinomies stem from Kołakowski’s failure to recognise the political nature of the notion of conatus and thus the political dimension of ethics.
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