Skip to main navigation menu Skip to main content Skip to site footer
SM baner

Vol. 73 No. 4 (2020): Oligarchia po transformacji

Rosja i jej sąsiedzi

Disinformation as part of the information war of the Russian Federation: assumptions and effectiveness

DOI: https://doi.org/10.35757/SM.2020.73.4.06
Submitted: September 11, 2021
Published: June 8, 2021

Abstract

The aim of this article is to analyse the Russian concept of disinformation and its effectiveness. It highlights the goals and instruments of Russian disinformation and outline Russia’s methods of manipulating the narrative from the beginning of the war in Ukraine and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia uses disinformation to weaken democratic institutions around the world and take advantage of international crises for its own benefit. According to the European Commission, Russia differs from other countries that disseminate disinformation, such as China, Iran, and North Korea. Its actions are long-term, systematic, and employ an extensive range of instruments to spread disinformation.

References

  1. Aleksandrowicz T., Zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego w ujęciu systemowym. Budowanie zdolności defensywnych i ofensywnych w infosferze, Difin, Warszawa 2021.
  2. Aro J., Trolle Putina. Prawdziwe historie z frontów rosyjskiej wojny informacyjnej, Sine Qua Non, Kraków 2020.
  3. Biondo N., Dalla Russia con amore. Mosca presenta il conto: vuole che l’Italia le dia una mano a togliere le sanzioni, „Linkiesta” [online], 1 V 2020 [dostęp: 2 VI 2021]: <https://www.linkiesta.it/2020/05/aiuti-russia-italia-coronavirus/?fbclid=Iwar1Iu5kyrynbkmplhd0l4MeOakkcdy2E6n_1cIwztf4nlx4fnof5NmHhUsY>.
  4. Bittman L., The kgb and Soviet disinformation. An insider’s view, Pergamon-Brassey, Washington 1985.
  5. Boghardt T., Soviet bloc intelligence and its aids disinformation campaign, „Studies in Intelligence” 2009, No. 53.
  6. Boulègue M., Polyakova A., The evolution of Russian hybrid warfare, „Center for European Policy Analysis” [online], 29 I 2021 [dostęp: 2 VI 2021]: <https://cepa.org/the-evolution-of-russian-hybrid-warfare-introduction/>.
  7. Darczewska J., The anatomy of Russian information warfare. The Crimean operation, a case study, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw 2014 (Point of View, 42): <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2014-05-22/anatomy-russian-information-warfare-crimean-operation-a-case-study> [dostęp: 20 II 2021].
  8. Darczewska J., Żochowski P., Active measures. Russian key export, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw 2017 (Point of View, 64): <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2017-05-30/active-measures-russias-key-export> [dostęp: 2 VII 2021].
  9. Disinformation resilience in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. A. Yeliseyeu, V. Damarad, Ukrainian Prism, Kyiv 2018: <http://prismua.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/dri_cee_2018.pdf> [dostęp: 2 VI 2021].
  10. Enikolopov R., Petrova M., Zhuravskaya E., Media and political persuasion. Evidence from Russia, „American Economic Review” 2011, No. 101 (7).
  11. Epifanova A., Deciphering Russia’s „sovereign internet law”. Tightening control and accelerating the splinternet, German Council on Foreign Relations, [Berlin] 2020 (DGAP Analysis, 2): <https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/dgap-analyse_2-2020_epifanova_0.pdf> [dostęp: 2 VI 2021].
  12. Fridman O., Russian „hybrid warfare”. Resurgence and politicization, Hurst & Company, United Kingdom 2018.
  13. Galeotti M., I’m sorry for creating the „Gerasimov doctrine”, „Foreign Policy” [online], 5 III 2018 [dostęp: 2 VI 2021]: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/>.
  14. Galeotti M., Putin’s hydra. Inside Russia’s intelligence services, European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2016 (Policy Brief): <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/196918/ecfr_169_-_inside_russias_intelligence_services_(web_and_print)_2.pdf> [dostęp: 2 VI 2021].
  15. Galeotti M., Russian political war. Moving beyond hybrid, Routledge, London–New York 2019.
  16. Gehlbach S., Reflections on Putin and the media, „Post-Soviet Affairs” 2010, No. 26 (1).
  17. Jonsson O., The Russian understanding of war. Blurring the lines between war and peace, Georgetown University Press, Washington 2019.
  18. Jowett G. S., O’Donnell V., Propaganda and persuasion, Sage, London 1999.
  19. Kaca E., Boosting cybersecurity resilience in the Eastern Partnership region. Options for the EU, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, [Warsaw] 25 II 2021 (Policy Paper, 5 (191)): <https://pism.pl/publications/Boosting_Cybersecurity_Resilience_in_the_Eastern_Partnership_Region_Options_for_the_eu#_ftn7> [dostęp: 2 VI 2021].
  20. Kakachia K., Lebanidze B., Georgia’s protracted transition: civil society, party politics and challenges to democratic transformation, [w:] 25 years of independent Georgia. Achievements and unfinished projects, ed. G. Nodia, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Ilia State University, [Tbilisi 2016]: <https://library.iliauni.edu.ge/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Georgia-2-5.pdf> [dostęp: 2 VI 2021].
  21. Kaplan L., The biggest social media operation you’ve never heard of is run out of Cyprus by Russians, „Lawfare – Hard National Security Choices” [online], 18 XII 2019 [dostęp: 2 VI 2021]: <https://www.lawfareblog.com/biggest-social-media-operation-youve-never-heard-run-out-cyprus-russians>.
  22. Kavanagh J., Rich M. D., Truth decay. An initial exploration of the diminishing role of facts and analysis in American public life, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica 2018: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/rr2314.html> [dostęp: 2 VI 2021].
  23. Kragh M., Åsberg S., Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures. The Swedish case, „Journal of Strategic Studies” 2017, No. 40 (6).
  24. Lefevr V., Refleksivnoe upravlenie, modelirovanie i moral′, [w:] V. Lefevr, Refleksiâ, Kogito-Centr, Moskva 2003.
  25. Legucka A., Russia on the global regulation of cyberspace, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, [Warsaw] 18 XII 2018 (Bulletin, 172 (1243)): <https://pism.pl/publications/Russia_on_the_Global_Regulation_of_Cyberspace> [dostęp: 2 VI 2021].
  26. Legucka A., Russia’s corona-diplomacy. Evaluation and prospects, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, [Warsaw] 4 VIII 2020 (Bulletin, 162 (1592)): <https://pism.pl/publications/Russias_Coronadiplomacy_Evaluation_and_Prospects> [dostęp: 2 VI 2021].
  27. Legucka A., Walka z rosyjską dezinformacją w Unii Europejskiej, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, [Warszawa] 6 viii 2019 (Biuletyn, 111 (1859)): <https://pism.pl/publikacje/Walka_z_rosyjska_dezinformacja_w_Unii_Europejskiej> [dostęp: 2 VI 2021].
  28. Liñan M. V., Putin’s propaganda legacy, „Post-Soviet Affairs” 2009, No. 25 (2).
  29. Litka P., Widowisko, oświata, propaganda, „Tygodnik Powszechny”, 7 v 2012.
  30. Lucas E., Pomeranzev P., Winning the information war. Techniques and counter-strategies to Russian propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe. A report by CEPA’s information warfare project in partnership with the Legatum Institute, Center for European Policy Analysis: <https://li.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/winning-the-information-war-full-report-pdf.pdf> [dostęp: 2 VI 2021].
  31. Marchetti V., Marks J. D., The CIA and the cult of intelligence, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1974.
  32. Martin L. J., Disinformation. An instrumentality in the propaganda arsenal, „Political Communication” 1982, No. 2 (1).
  33. Mizzi S., Russia’s disinformation war, „Georgetown Security Studies Review” [online], 25 X 2016 [dostęp: 2 VI 2021]: <https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2016/10/25/russias-disinformation-war/>.
  34. Panarin I., Informacionnaâ vojna i kommunikacii, Gorâčaâ liniâ, Telekom, Moskva 2016.
  35. Philips T., Truth. A brief history of total bullshit, Headline Publishing Group, London 2019.
  36. Pomerantsev P., Nothing is true, and everything is possible. The surreal heart of the new Russia, Faber and Faber, London 2015.
  37. The process and effects of mass communication, ed. W. Schramm, University of Illinois Press, Urbana 1954.
  38. Renz B., Russia’s military revival, Polity Press, Cambridge 2018.
  39. Rosja wobec państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej: zagrożenia pozamilitarne, red. T. Stępniewski, Instytut Europy Środkowej, Lublin 2020.
  40. Saari S., Russia’s post-Orange Revolution strategies to increase its influence in former Soviet republics. Public diplomacy po russkii, „Europe-Asia Studies” 2014, No. 66 (1).
  41. Snyder T., Droga do niewolności. Rosja, Europa, Ameryka, Znak Horyzont, Kraków 2019.
  42. Świerczek M., Maki-Miraż, czyli sowiecka sztuka dezinformacji, „Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego” 2019, nr 21.
  43. Tolz V., Teper Y., Broadcasting agitainment. A new media strategy of Putin’s third presidency, „Post-Soviet Affairs” 2018, No. 34 (4).
  44. [Twenty five] 25 years of independent Georgia. Achievements and unfinished projects, ed. G. Nodia, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Ilia State University, [Tbilisi 2016]: <https://library.iliauni.edu.ge/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Georgia-2-5.pdf> [dostęp: 2 VI 2021].
  45. Walters B., TV network’s attempt to stifle Silvio Berlusconi documentary backfires, „The Guardian” [online], 3 IX 2009 [dostęp: 2 VI 2021]: <https://www.theguardian.com/film/2009/sep/03/silvio-berlusconi-videocracy-documentary>.
  46. Weitz R., Assessing the Russian disinformation campaign during COVID-19, „International Centre for Defence and Security” [online], 13 XI 2020 [dostęp: 2 VI 2021]: <https://icds.ee/en/assessing-the-russian-disinformation-campaign-during-covid-19/>.
  47. Włodkowska-Bagan A., Zagrożenia o charakterze informacyjnym, [w:] Rosja wobec państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej: zagrożenia pozamilitarne, red. T. Stępniewski, Instytut Europy Środkowej, Lublin 2020.
  48. Wojnowski M., „Zarządzanie refleksyjne” jako paradygmat rosyjskich operacji informacyjno-psychologicznych w XXI wieku, „Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego” 2015, nr 12.
  49. Yaffa J., Between two fires. Truth, ambition and compromise in Putin’s Russia, Granta, London 2020.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.