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Vol. 75 No. 2 (2022): Dezinformacja i operacje wpływu

Dezinformacja i operacje wpływu

Artificial intelligence as an instrument of intensification hybrid threats in the information domain

DOI: https://doi.org/10.35757/SM.2022.75.2.06
Submitted: January 16, 2022
Published: December 31, 2022

Abstract

Due to polymorphic and multidimension character, hybrid threats became an useful tool implemented in grey zone of interaction between authoritarian and democratic states. Simultaneously, their spectrum might be dynamically upgraded and expanded, thanks to  technological development. Artificial intelligence is one of these tools, which can intensify power and range of hybrid threats. Using a conceptual model proposed by the European Centre of Excellence in Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid COE), it is possible to determine the potential of artificial intelligence in influencing an information domain. There, it could be used to manipulate an infosphere, mainly through disinformation and interference. For this purpose ai can play analytical-decision making, narrative and axiological functions by striking the foundations of democracy and distorting and undermining relations between state and society. It is also worth to note, that while so far states have been the main operators of hybrid operations, the development of this technology may increase the non-state actors importance as this technology will become more accessible for them.

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