The aim of this article is to describe the most important conditions and implications that characterise relations between Russia and Libya from the Arab Spring to the present day. The main thesis of this article assumes that the Kremlin is striving to play a significant role in the Middle East, seeing this as an opportunity to depreciate the importance of the United States, which Russia treats as its main political opponent in Europe. I have decided to present this topic as a result of the discussions in the scientific discourse on the instruments with which the Russian Federation wants to strengthen its political position in the Middle East and North Africa. Initially, this article discusses the relations of the two entities from the end of World War II to the outbreak of social protests in the Middle East in 2011, focusing on their contacts during the Cold War. Later in this article, the mutual ties between the countries after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi and the increased involvement of the Kremlin in the Libyan issue are described. Additionally, the article presents the goals of the growing activity of the Russian authorities in Libya from 2014 to 2018, as evidenced by the support of Russian politicians for General Khalif Haftar’s actions and the presence of the Wagner group aimed at supporting him. In this context, it is indispensable to mention the importance of the events in Syria for the strategy adopted by Moscow in the Libyan conflict. Moreover, the article tries to trace the rivalry between Russia and Turkey in Libya, which has been growing stronger in 2019 and 2020, by analysing its broad international context. The issue of economic contacts between Moscow and Tripoli is also worth attention. In conclusion, the article attempts to answer the question of whether the Russian Federation’ activities in Libya should be expected to intensify in the near future in the era of the progressive coronavirus pandemic and whether the global position of the United States should be expected to weaken.