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SP baner

Tom 52 Nr 2 (2024)

Integracja europejska/Unia Europejska

Populacja imigrantów, a zdolność Polski do budowania koalicji blokujących w Radzie Unii Europejskiej

DOI: https://doi.org/10.35757/STP.2024.52.2.04
Przesłane: 14 marca 2023
Opublikowane: 21 czerwca 2024

Abstrakt

One of the consequences of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation against Ukraine is the increase in the number of foreigners living in Poland. This paper examines the potential impact of Poland’s population growth on its ability to build minimally blocking coalitions in the Council. For this purpose the article is developing a new voting model dedicated to qualified majority voting in this institution. Using the analysis of structure of blocking I find that an increase in Poland’s population of 2 million leads to an increase of about half in the number of minimal blocking coalitions of five or six countries it can form together with Germany or France. However, even an additional 4 million residents will not significantly increase Poland’s ability to form blocking coalitions in opposition to the German-French tandem.

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