The author raises the question of whether secret uses of power by democratic states can form a legitimate exercise of democratic authority. On the face of it, the answer seems negative. First, it is commonplace to think that in a democracy, political decisions are legitimate only if they are authorized by citizens. From this perspective, secret uses of power seem to lack democratic authority because, one argues, people cannot authorize what they are denied knowledge about. Second, the exercise of democratic authority requires that citizens be able to hold officials accountable, and to do that citizens must know what officials are doing and why. Yet how can citizens call their representatives to account for secret political decisions and processes if they are denied knowledge of them? The author analyses each of these two dimensions of democratic governance and argues that secrecy, under certain conditions, may be a legitimate form of democratic governance.
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