This article examines the relationship between science and democracy in the context of contemporary populism. Contrary to the widespread belief that science provides a natural antidote to populist politics, the tension between these two spheres is irreducible. The conceptions developed by Popper and by Collins and Evans, despite their democratic aspirations, reproduce scientific elitism and constrain democratic pluralism. Drawing on Latour, the article argues that the division between the “pure” realm of science and the “chaotic” realm of politics legitimizes expert authority and reinforces an anti-pluralist logic shared by both science and populism: both offer a single indisputable solution and both are suspicious of democratic contestation. The way out of this impasse lies in Feyerabend’s methodological pluralism. Science can serve democracy only insofar as it ceases to be treated as a privileged arbiter of truth
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