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No. 18 (2010)

Articles

The impact of the events of 1968 on the FRG’s Ostpolitik and its reception in Poland

DOI: https://doi.org/10.35757/RPN.2010.18.04
Submitted: November 16, 2020
Published: March 30, 2010

Abstract

The impact of the 1968 events on the FRG’s Ostpolitik and its reception in Poland may be considered in the short and the long term. What the article takes into consideration are the short-term effects of this political approach, observed in the years 1968–1969.
Writing about the events of 1968, the author dwells on March 1968 in Poland, or more precisely, on those of its aspects which were related to the formation and implementation of the state’s policy, namely, the turbulence in ruling circles, the replacing of the people who occupied the high-ranking posts and the staffing changes in Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the creators of Germany’s Eastern politics, what was fundamental was the intervention of the Warsaw Treaty armies in Czechoslovakia. The rebellion among the youth was of lesser importance to the current politics at the time. Its consequences were felt mostly in the succeeding years and were related, i.a., to public opinion in the FRG and its attitude toward the forms and extent of normalising relations with the countries of East Europe, including Poland.
After 1968, in the case of the FRG, the mode of implementation of its Eastern politics was modified. It was concluded that it is the Soviet Union which must be the main partner in any talks (though it was the most important interlocutor anyway, albeit attempts were also made to hold autonomous talks with the satellite countries) and that attention must be paid to avoiding the impression that for Bonn, Ostpolitik is just an instrument to help loosen intra-block dependencies.
For Poland, the events of 1968 implied a reduced field of manoeuvre, not so much because not only in Bonn, but also in other Western capitals, it was formally acknowledged that the priority lies with Moscow, but also because of diplomatic practice. Warsaw did not, however, intend to give up the right to pursue its interests, tangible evidence of which was provided by the diplomatic activity of 1969, manifest both by a turn in its policy toward Germany, and by undertaking efforts to sell its own vision of the European Conference. 

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