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Tom 72 Nr 4 (2019): Rosja i Białoruś: trudni sąsiedzi

Gabinet dyplomatyczny

Sankcje jako forma dialogu

DOI: https://doi.org/10.35757/SM.2019.72.4.04
Przesłane: 28 sierpnia 2020
Opublikowane: 21 sierpnia 2020

Abstrakt

The article proposes a broader view on international economic sanctions. They should be recognized not only as a tool of coercion but multifunction foreign policy instrument to punish, detere, reassure and signal. As a matter of fact restrictions have turned into an important ingredient of political dialogue. The article questions the dominant approach focused on narrowly defined effectiveness measured by a visible and major change in a target’s policy. Looking at sanctions as a form of communicating preferences and interests, as well as an element of bargaining game, allows to better understand their political functions and thus to nuance an assessment of their effectiveness. The significance of restrictions introduced after the annexation of Crimea and later on goes beyond provoking a change in Russian policy, beyond critique of past misdeeds and an attempt to restore the status quo. Actually, they are about sending a credible signal to the future to convince potential Russian followers that their actions will be charged with specific costs.

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