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Tom 46 Nr 3 (2018)

Integracja europejska/Unia Europejska

Changes in the EU Single Market in the Aftermath of the Crises

DOI: https://doi.org/10.35757/STP.2018.46.3.05
Przesłane: 22 kwietnia 2025
Opublikowane: 20 września 2018

Abstrakt

The objective of this article is to present the most important single market changes in the aftermath of the crises that hit the EU after 2008. As a result of various economic and social problems, European societies have been reluctant to adopt liberal solutions. Furthermore an increasing number of leading politicians, both in EU member states and within EU institutions, have ceased to support the single market's previous direction of liberalization, which consisted in extending the four treaty freedoms (i.e., movement of persons, goods, services and capital in this market) and removing protectionist barriers in each individual country. Crises have strenghtened the tendency to introduce minimum EU regulatory standards in the invidual markets. These standards do not always increase the freedom of exchange and sometimes even reverse previous gains in the internal market or strenghten protectionism by national administrations. EU regulations also have a growing influence on the competitiveness of specific players in the single market, as well as on the distribution of costs and benefits between the actors involved in economic exchanges. Another feature of the change is the gradual closure of the EU to external rivals, and the introduction of arbitrary, individualized, and politicized management of their access to investment and economic activity in the single market.

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