What is Interest if There Is No Interest? Hegel’s Dialectic of Interest and Selfessness

Abstract

The article discusses the category of interest, which is an explanatory category of social phenomena in materialist ontology, particularly the Marxist variety. The considerations are guided by Hegel’s conviction that every category taken in abstraction loses its exploratory value, so instead of asking for such an ultimate basis for explanation, one should investigate what else should be assumed for something – interest – to really mean something. Following this advice, the text carries out a conceptual analysis of the categories of life, teleology and identity and their mutual relationship based on Hegelian philosophy. Overcoming the ambiguity of Hegel’s argument makes it possible to uncover the dialectically negative identity of spirit that is society and nature, which, transferred to the dimension of social relations, makes it possible to talk about the internal connection of interest with its negation, which is disinterestedness. It turns out that interest can only mean something if it is related to disinterestedness, which, again, on the grounds of social relations and especially class conflict, proves to be the interest of the possibility of being disinterested. In the final part of the article, the result of these considerations is referred to Hegelian social philosophy, where it turns out to be reflected in the relation between the two main categories of ‘ethical life’ and ‘moral life’ usually devalued by interpreters. At the same time, the relation between these categories corresponds to the relation between the universal model of the bourgeoisie with their economic interests and the disinterested representatives of the general estate.