The article analyses the evolution of the United States’ approach to economic relations with China and assesses whether these changes can be interpreted as a process of securitisation within the framework of the Copenhagen School. The point of departure is the assumption that standard economic analysis tools are insufficient to explain contemporary tensions in the international trading system, particularly in the US–China relations. The study employs a political economy perspective, focusing on the identification of securitising actors, the threats they articulate, audience response and the extraordinary measures they propose and implement.
The analysis covers three stages: the proto-securitisation period prior to 2008, the phase of maturing securitisation discourse between 2008 and 2016, and the stage of executive securitisation after 2016. It is shown that this process was gradual and driven by both expert communities and political actors, culminating in the adoption by the administrations of Donald Trump and Joe Biden of a broad set of economic policy instruments justified on national security grounds.
The findings indicate that US–China economic relations have been largely subordinated to the logic of securitisation, as reflected in both political discourse and policy practice. This process appears to be durable and challenges the foundations of the liberal trade order based on World Trade Organization principles, contributing to its erosion and to the growing role of the state and political factors in shaping economic relations.
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