Growing tensions on the EU’s eastern border, coupled with Donald Trump’s isolationist declarations, have sparked a new debate on the trajectory of integration in the fi eld of EU security policy following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as on the role of Germany and France as key actors shaping the future of Europe’s security architecture. The authors examine the extent to which the EU’s security and defence policy can be perceived as an underutilised ‘trump card’ of the European Union and whether its full potential requires deeper integration or can instead be achieved through differentiated integration and cooperation outside the Union’s formal structures. The article argues that the limited utilisation of the EU’s security and defence potential does not result from a lack of institutional instruments but rather from divergent member-state preferences regarding their activation. Germany represents an inclusive model based on broad participation, consensus-building, and the perception of extra-EU formats as supportive mechanisms for future EU integration. France, by contrast, promotes an avant-garde model, favouring narrower coalitions of willing states, flexible forms of cooperation, and the development of European strategic autonomy. These differences are reflected in varying thresholds for activating defence initiatives, contrasting approaches to cooperation outside EU structures, and distinct leadership ambitions. France possesses additional advantages in the form of nuclear capabilities and a greater willingness to assume a leadership role, while Germany has strengthened its position through increased defence spending and the development of military capabilities. The findings suggest that the EU’s security and defence policy remains a partially underutilised asset whose effectiveness depends on reconciling Germany’s logic of inclusiveness and legitimacy with France’s emphasis on effectiveness and strategic autonomy. The future of European defence will depend not on eliminating differentiation, but on the ability to employ diverse forms of cooperation as mechanisms that reinforce, rather than substitute for, integration at the EU level.
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