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Vol. 46 No. 4 (2018)

Theory of politics

The Rationality of Pluralism in Light of the Idea of Deliberative Democracy

DOI: https://doi.org/10.35757/STP.2018.46.4.08
Submitted: April 16, 2025
Published: December 20, 2018

Abstract

The article deals with the theory of deliberative democracy, which is considered from an analytical perspective. Its main aim is to identify the primary directive of the rationality of pluralism, which forms the meta-argumentative level of discourse on deliberative democracy. In the article, we investigate the theoretical path that the idea of deliberative democracy has passed from Rawls’ works through those of Cohen to Brian Barry’s impartiality. We also refer to critical voices which highlight topics of interest. The main directives that we distinguish within the rationality of pluralism are: equality, justification, procedure and impartiality. We also point out that these directives may lead to inconsistencies in theories of deliberative democracy. We indicate that the plurality of rationalities is an alternative approach to the rationality of pluralism; however, this is not within the scope of our argument in this article.

References

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