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Vol. 75 No. 2 (2022): Dezinformacja i operacje wpływu

Bliski Wschód

The interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the relationship between policy and war in Clausewitz’s theory

DOI: https://doi.org/10.35757/SM.2022.75.2.10
Submitted: April 5, 2023
Published: 2022-12-31

Abstract

The article aims to propose a conceptual model, based on the author’s synthesis of Clausewitz’s thoughts, which can serve as an analytical framework for considerations related to the relationship between policy and war and the use of force. The model can help assess the causes of US strategic debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in addressing future possible contingencies that could require the employment of military power. Its main advantage, in relation to prevailing Western ways of thinking about war, is a radical expansion of the area of responsibility of politics, which is not only decision-making but also an analytical domain that determines the sensibility of further steps.

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