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Vol. 72 No. 2 (2019): Kryzys na świecie - świat w kryzysie

Forum

The banking union and the European Monetary Fund as an alternative to the fiscal union in the Eurozone?

DOI: https://doi.org/10.35757/SM.2019.72.2.10
Submitted: January 26, 2020
Published: September 27, 2019

Abstract

The public debt crisis in the Eurozone, which began in 2010, showed serious weaknesses of the structure on which it was based. It was only thanks to extraordinary intervention activities that the situation was stabilised and the risk of the disintegration of this zone was eliminated. Currently, an urgent task for the institutions and member states of the European Union is to develop and implement solutions that would avoid such risks in the future. The aim of the article is to analyse and evaluate the possibilities of deepening integration in the euro area towards fiscal federalism and to examine whether the banking union and the future European Monetary Fund could be alternative solutions to the fiscal union. The analysis leads to a negative answer to this question due to the significant differences between the two projects in terms of their objectives, scopes and potential consequences from the perspective of the participating countries’ sovereignty. This analysis also shows that the banking union is an expression of a pragmatic approach to potential threats to the Eurozone’s stability in a situation where the establishment of a fiscal union is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

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